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ABSTRACT PAGE

While Japanese media has risen to perceptible prominence in American society over the
past decade, it is often considered to be sudden and unfounded, but there is historical and societal
precedence. Since 1858, when American sailor Commodore Matthew Perry forced open the gates
of the then-isolationist Japanese society, the United States and Japan have had a singular
relationship on the global stage, one both destructive and creative, fraught with cultural and
political tensions but also defined by exchange of goods, ideas, and cultural mores. The two
countries have long traveled through the tumults of history together.
This thesis is an illustration of this particular relationship. Through the vectors of three
visual media commodities -the movie “Godzilla,” the television program “Speed Racer,” and the
animated film “Akira”- it tells the story of a complicated dynamic that has existed for nearly two
centuries. Through the overarching narrative path of trauama, denial, and recovery, it considers
how politics have affected the way media is marketed and perceived; the changes that are made
when an object is transferred from one society to another, and how it is differently interpreted;
the way world events and politics shape stories, and finally how all these things come together
not only as a means to better understand each other -culturally, socially, politically- but how we
understand ourselves, and where these transnational trends may take us in the future.
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The Immigrant, The Native Son, and the Ambassador: The Transnational Travels of
Godzilla, Speed Racer, and Akira
Chapter 1 - Introduction
When I was eight years old, I saw the movie Akira for the first time. There is no doubt in my
mind that the after school teachers who screened it that afternoon had no intention of showing us
anything but another seemingly innocuous cartoon; I do wonder, however, why no one thought to
turn it off once the film began. For two hours we sat and stared as the film played out: a neoapocalyptic tale of biker gangs, illicit drugs, political corruption and media excess. Perhaps such
themes were commonplace for children of the later Reagan administration, but the film’s central
image was the psychic conflagration of a Japanese boy’s consciousness that ultimately manifests
outwardly and consumes Japan — if not the world— in a flash of atomic silence and light. The word
that I would later use to describe my impressions of the experience was, appropriately, “traumatic.”
Now let me step back and put this in a broader context.
I was eight years old in 1991, and the Cold War was over. This was two years after Akira's
multinational release in the spring of 1989, the same year the Berlin Wall came down and political
scientist Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history1. Its opening sequence —a placid and calm
Tokyo (date, July 16, 1988), decimated by a fireball reminiscent of the ones that consumed
Hiroshima and Nagasaki four decades earlier-— must have resonated very deeply in the minds of
A kira’s initial audiences. The fact that the words on the screen immediately proceeding the title
—“31 years after the end of World War III”— might have seemed both prophetic and evocative of
the nuclear fear that lingered like so much fallout after the Japanese surrender of August 15, 1945.

'Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest (Summer 1989)
Accessed online at: http://www.wesiones.com/eoh.htm Aug. 5, 2008
1

What did this film have to do with communism and/or nuclear policy? Absolutely nothing.
In fact, the blast around which the film centers had nothing to do with a weapon. But Akira emerges
in the narrative of post-atomic global relations at the point where history returns to its traumatic
ground zero and its denizens finally begin to recover..
Akira gnawed at my consciousness for the next six years; in 1997 the Sci-Fi channel, riding
the wave of a burgeoning new trend, showed the movie on its weekly feature “Saturday Anime.” And
I was changed, not in as poetic a way as undergoing a revelation; rather it was as if I was clotheslined
by a cultural medium that has only grown stronger and more prevalent over the past decade. When
Akira first appeared, the word anime2was overshadowed by the then-popular term “Japanimation”;
by 1997, not only had anime entered into the vernacular, but it was suddenly everywhere, Japan was
everywhere. Since then the threads of our intersecting cultures have only become more knotted and
inescapable. And yet we look around and seem shocked that suddenly these pictures, these
characters, these products of a society so different and yet so frighteningly like our own have risen
to a kind of pop cultural dominance so far from their native land.3
I speak of Akira, in a sense, as an ambassador at the “end of history,” not just of time and
place. Akira closes the historical narrative of trauma, denial, and recovery that has metaphorically
(and metaphysically at times) characterized our cultural discourse with Japan. As a site of

2The Merriam Webster website cites the word “anime” as being added in 1988. Accessed
online at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/anime Aug. 5, 2008
3Several books that address this phenomenon include: Japanamerica: How Japanese Pop
Culture Has Invaded the U.S., Roland Kelts; Pikachu’s Global Adventure: The Rise and Fall o f
Pokemon, ed. Joseph Tobin; Full Metal Apache: Transactions Between Cyberpunk Japan and
Avant-P op America, Takayuki Tatsumi; Mechademia 1: Emerging Worlds o f Anime and Manga,
ed. Frenchy Cunning. Except for Cunning’s book, all of these are cited throughout this paper.
2

reclamation, Akira allows for the doors to the past to be flung wide, letting in the global, familiar
products that preceded it: a rather conspicuous immigrant, and a native son that has only been
recognized as an Other many years later. Even at the end of the film, we are meant to understand that
the dialogue of American-Japanese cultural relations is neither new nor exceptional, that the
narrative is of these encounters is underway; “mo hajimateiru kara ne,” says a child’s voice: “It’s
already started.”

It seems that few countries delight in visual representations of their own destruction quite as
much as the United States and Japan4, which is oddly fitting: as the creators and only intended
victims of the atomic bomb, the two are uniquely paired in a relationship of conflagration that all at
once altered and unequivocally bound them together.
Even before this connection, Japan and the United States shared a telling and important
feature in their history. Prior to World War II —with the exception of the War of 1812 in the U.S.—
each had little to no experience with a large-scale invading foreign force. The origins of the word
“kamikaze” (the “divine wind” that would become such a memorable and terrifying part of World
War II’s Pacific theater) led back to a 13th century Chinese attempt to attack Japan which was
thwarted by horrific storms. The Atlantic gap between the U.S. and Europe allowed the former to

4Examples include a number o f large-scale disaster movies made in each country. To
name a few: Independence Day (USA, 1996), Miracle Mile (USA, 1988), The Sum o f All Fears
(USA, 2002) The Sinking o f Japan (Japan, 2006), Dragonhead (Japan, 2003) Godzilla (Japan,
1956), Akira (Japan, 1988). Further examples include apocalyptic literature and television
programs. Internet Movie Database: http://www.imdb.com Accessed online: Aug. 5, 2008 and
Craddock, Jim ed. Videohound’s Golden Movie Retriever 2008 (Farmington Hills, Michigan:
Gale Group, 2008)
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escape the massive devastation of the first World War. Beginning in 1931 with the Manchurian
Incident, Japan cut an enormous military swath through southeast Asia, remaining untouched itself
until more than a decade later.
I have chosen to focus on the U.S.-Japanese relationship as a forum and site for discussing
the processes of time and cultural understanding because they are a unique bonding of the destroyer
and the destroyed, the typhoid Mary that heals the sick, the teacher and the student, the other that
resembles the United States so closely that we fail to recognize (or perhaps choose to disregard) that
it is not of our own place/time/ideology/culture. The relationship that has evolved between them is
dangerous, fast, and revolutionary. It will continue to evolve as the 21st century dawns on a world
where Asian powers are already challenging Western economic powers that have dominated the
global economy for almost a millenium.
This state of affairs began at the end of the Pacific War; two morally and mortally opposed
countries hesitantly stretched out the metaphorical olive branch of tentative reconciliation that would
bring them together at the political table and open up the avenue o f communication.5 The
conversation that arose from the ashes is one of policy and politics, economics and marketing, of
social regeneration and national realignment in an increasingly globalized world, of cultural border
crossing and domestic infiltration.

5“Beginning with Pearl Harbor and ending with the emperor’s capitulation after the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the war between Japan and the Allied forces lasted
three years and eight months; the occupation of the defeated nation began in August 1945 and
ended in April 1952, six years and eight months later, almost twice as long as the war itself.
...Responsibility for occupied Germany...divided as it was among the United States, England,
France, and the Soviet Union, lack the focused intensity that came with America’s unilateral
control over Japan.” John Dower Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake o f World War II (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 23
4

The era that began on August 6, 1945 offers a defining time frame of analysis and
confrontation. After the atomic bombs, Japanese surrender, and American occupation, Japan and the
U.S. — once the greatest of enemies— became the best and strangest of friends, sharing and trading
objects and ideologies until origins become clouded, forgotten or unrecognized for years.6 The
resulting cultural products, such as cars, electronics, and forms of media challenged the two
countries to construct the new narrative of transnationalism in the broader scope of time. The cultural
production o f postwar Japan, the atomic United States, and their new life together not only rewrote
their national self-definitions, but also rewrote their national boundaries through a new hybrid
cultural identity. This identity—global, cosmopolitan, culturally charged and forcefully appealing—
suggests that the current and longstanding nationalist paradigm is insufficient. The hybrid identity
rested on incorporating cultural goods transnationally into everyday life. It is no longer enough to
speak in definitives, to say “this is what a people is”; the popular acceptance and readings of
transnational products does not simply concern the social life of goods.7 Rather the socializing by
which goods enter into relationships with the people they visit across national borders leaves both
the landscape and audiences changed. Particularly where Asian (in this case Japanese) commodities
are concerned, Thomas Kim asserts the following: '
“Both the pedagogical and performative aspects of the Oriental object reveal how the Orient
comes to be almost exclusively associated with things, things that can gather the
problematics of the Orient both inside and outside American and things that can showcase

6This is particularly notable in the world of visual entertainment, where The Magnificent
Seven was derived from Kurosawa Akira’s Seven Samurai, and in television programming where
a number of the animation shows aimed at children through the 1960's and 70's were Japanese in
origin and theme. Speed Racer, o f course, was one o f them.
7Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life o f Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective
(Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4
5

the modernist dialectic of distance and proximity within the registers of history and
geography, The traffic in... Oriental objects -and their absorption into the very homes of the
middle class consumers- occasions an intimacy with the other, and...this process creates
destabilizations in the time and space of the self and its attendant culture even as it ostensibly
promises self-aggrandizement.”8
\

If the Orient was manifest in goods, the postwar U.S./Japanese national identities were remade with
and through things. By approaching relationship through visual mediators, one can understand both
the context of such products and their influence on American popular conceptions of the world. As
a people, we come to know ourselves in the broader context of our experiences outside our person,
our culture, our country, through the rhetoric of healing and affirmation in an increasingly global
world, in this instance through transition from trauma to denial to recovery. Such transnational
relations are played out not only in politics and society but in the visual and the easily consumed:
“[...]the very operations of American consumer culture conditions the way in which the Orient is
conceived... this idea of the Orient with its discursive operations is inseparable from thinking about
oneself as modem.”9 The awkward immigrant, the neighbor perceived as a native son, and the
ambassador finally open the passage to this modernity, to a new age of understanding and
conversation.
And now I will introduce them to you by the names you should already know. The immigrant
is Godzilla, the giant radioactive lizard that served as the metaphor of the dawning nuclear age.
Arriving on American shores in 1956, Godzilla was stripped of its political and social contexts and
consumed as a commodity rather than a piece of Cold War self-consciousness. The native son is

8Thomas W. Kim, “Being Modem: The Circulation o f Oriental Objects,” American
Quarterly 58, 2 (June, 2006): 380
9Ibid., 386
6

Speed Racer (1966-1968), a culturally androgynous world traveler drawn in Japan but inspired by
American superheroes. He just wants to be allowed to drive a car that would make James Bond
jealous, but he inhabits the static social space between the beginning and the end of
Japanese/American global power narratives. The ambassador is Akira (1988), often absent even
within his own film, a psychic child whose untapped power is both the destruction and hope of a
world at the end of a century. Their three stories implicate larger transnational relationships of the
U.S. and Japan and a global post-nuclear world. They confront worlds not of their making — they
bring the warning that without adaptation we are vulnerable, not only to our enemies and friends, but
to the relentless cycles of forgetting and denial and continued trauma.
In this thesis I will argue the following: that Godzilla had to be deeply altered and virtually
stripped of its symbolic associations to find acceptance from the American audience is key to making
legitimate our claims upon and perceptions o f the world and our place within the larger global
culture. Speed Racer is significant as an all-American hero who is nonetheless distinctly Japanese.
He seems to be “American” but he exists in a world defined by very specific Japanese cultural
constructions and values, while playing out power politics in the microcosms of the international
racing circuit. Americans only came to recognize the Japanese invasion o f their televisions years
after the fact, when Akira blew up the world not once but twice, and his story’s popularity revealed
an American awareness that Japan had colonized U.S. consciousness. Progressing from the trauma
of nuclear war, through the denial o f a so-called apolitical age to ultimate recovery at the end of a
century, these stories tell us about the future of U.S.-Japanese cultural connections, and how
commodities can reflect and create those international relations. Since the wrong sun rose in that
distant August, America and Japan have traveled together through ages of cultural collision, book7

ended by earth-changing and world-shattering explosions (physical and metaphorical), each one
ending and beginning with the promise of a new day and a new world.
Each still confronts the challenges of the commitment to that promise.

Before there was trauma, there was history.
Following the death of retired regent Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1598, the warlord Tokugawa
Ieyasu assumed control of Japan, and from the early part of the 17th century, enforced a strict policy
of political and national isolation.10 No foreign books, ideas, or people were permitted into the
country, with only existing trade relations between China and the Netherlands still permitted, the
Dutch emissaries nevertheless confined to the small island of Deshima in the Nagasaki harbor,
forbidden from entering the mainland.11At the time of Japan’s closure the United States did not exist
and was a mere scattering o f struggling colonies emanating from the Virginia swamp where the
English had landed in 1607. Two centuries later, however, America had established its independence
on the battlefields and after the War of 1812, emerged as a viable contender on the global stage.12
In 1842, notwithstanding the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. would join the British in prying open the
doors of Chinese trade in the aftermath of the Opium War. Although its concessions and rights from

10Louis Frederic and Kathe Roth, Japan Encyclopedia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2002), 332
uDonald Keene, The Japanese Discovery o f Europe, 1720-1830 (Palo Alto, CA;
Standford University Press, 1969)
12Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815, The New American Nation
Series (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 324
8

China would follow British terms of reparations, with the Treaty of Wanxia in 1844 the U.S. could
claim its first extraterritorial ventures into the same colonial trends that had spawned it.13
In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry and his fleet, forever after to be remembered by the
ominous title “The Black Ships,’’arrived on Japanese shores near the Edo capital requesting a treaty
and a cessation of the self-imposed isolation. Although initially rebuffed, Perry returned again in
1854, securing the Treaty of Kanagawa; the U.S. became the first nation to claim full friendship and
cooperation with Japan since its removal from history in 1598.14
The story appears as a tale of liberation from bondage: without Perry or the Americans and
their frightening, imposing technology, Japan might have been lost in the seas of antiquity,
hopelessly adrift far away from the rapid tides of modernity. The truth is, of course, more
complicated. A decade after Perry’s initial visit, Japan fell into the period of intense turmoil known
as the Bakumatsu, during which the shogunate and bakufu governmental structures collapsed, and

13Emily S. Rosenberg, Dennis Merrill, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Paul S. Boyer, T. Christopher
Jespersen, Nancy Mitchell, Bruce Kuniholm, J. L. Granatstein, Mark T. Gilderhaus, “Foreign
Relations” The Oxford Companion to United States History. Paul S. Boyer ed. (Oxford
University Press, 2001), found in Oxford Reference Online, accessed online at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/entry.html?subview=main&entrv:=tl 19.e0556-s0005
Apr. 22, 2009
14Signed on March 31, 1854, the Treaty of Kanagawa was a peace and friendship treaty
between Japan and the United States as represented by Commodore Perry. To wit, the Treaty
allowed for “opening the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to international trade, allowing ships to
resupply in these ports, and establishing an American consulate at Shimoda.” This agreement
would eventually force Japan to concede to the desires of other Western powers -the English,
Dutch, and Russians- and sign similar treaties with them over the next few years. Frederic and
Rothe, Japan Encyclopedia, 466
9

the country divided over whether to rebuild them or reinstate the imperial system abandoned in the
16th century.15
The imperialists were victorious, and the conflict ended in what is called the Meiji
Restoration of 1868. The Meij i Emperor ascended the throne in the new imperial capital of Tokyo,
and quite abruptly, secular time began again. Japan not only caught up to the world it had once
abandoned, but surpassed all expectations. With the same ingenuity it had used in reworking the
Chinese writing system into its own ingenious kanji or in bending Buddhist beliefs to adhere around
its indigenous Shinto religion, Japan modernized and industrialized at a truly startling pace. This
time Japan embraced the now-considerable Western influence it had formerly denied and rejected.16
Modernity infiltrated even those things traditionally Japanese —woodblock prints of the age depict
Japanese soldiers in westem-style dress uniforms, carriages, and ships to match the great sea trawlers
of the Eurocentric world. Japanese students spread out across the globe to western universities and
brought back knowledge of political and cultural systems, as well as methods of industrialization.
But it was not only Europe that Japan referenced— it looked to the United States, its own “far east,”

15In Japan, the period of time from 1485 to 1576 is known as the “Warring States Era,” an
age during which various lords struggled to attain power over the country. At this time, “the
imperial court -powerless and uninterested in the fate of the country, concerned only with
surviving in its devastated capital [Kyoto], and prey to bandits of all sorts- was forced to place
itself under the ‘protection’ of whoever held power at the time.” When the civil wars ended,
Japan was under the control of shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Frederic and Roth, 329
16“[...]Europeans had become little more than exotic and amusing creatures by the end of
the [18th] century.” Marius B. Jansen, The Making o f Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2002), 83
10

a nation itself undergoing its own global metamorphosis in the realm of international and
cosmopolitan consumerism.17
As these changes took place, the West examined the East, and delighted in Japan’s mirroring
o f western and consumer culture. China might have been a novel site for retrieving tea and fine
dishware, but “the Japanese in particular won favor because of their manufactures and artwork.”18
One article praising design said the “‘ingenious’ Japanese deserved the title ‘Yankees of the East.’
Another lauded the Japanese for their ‘Western quickness.’”19
1905 saw little Japan defeat the Russian navy in the first Asian victory over a Western power.
The end of the First World War found Japan participating in the Treaty of Versailles talks, receiving
small reparations and emerging as the only Asian nation to be considered a truly legitimate member
o f the global hierarchical order. Japan would seize on this privilege throughout the post-Meiji
Taisho government and capitalize on it during Hirohito’s Showa regime, striding across East Asian
and European colonial holdings throughout the East Indies in the decade prior to the assault on Pearl
Harbor in 1941.20 From the country o f the “thirteen original colonies,” Japan had learned to itself
become a colonizer, an act that would not merely alter history, but start it again.

17Frederic and Roth, Japan Encyclopedia, 332
18In his discussion of the early 20th century interest in goods from East Asia, Kim touches
on this particular favoritism by suggesting that “an object from the Orient can indeed produce a
new modem sensibility, conditioning the individual with a new attitude toward consumption,
making legible the contradictions that mass culture presents to the consumer.” (See “Becoming
Oriental”), 387
19Kristin Hoganson, Consumers 1Imperium: The Global Production o f American
Domesticity, 1865-1920 (Ghapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 30
20Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming o f the Pacific War: A B rief History with
Documents and Essays (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1996), 8
11

Would Japan have emerged as an international player without the influence of the United
States? Probably. But it is impossible to deny the sheer magnitude of the effect that the U.S. had on
Japan, simply by virtue of each country’s unique position in the world. The United States developed
as a kind o f new-West, independent of Europe and Japan a new-East, more civilized than and
unruled by China. While the Japanese relationship had at times been considered a kind of colonial
endeavor in the United States, Japan was never actually colonized like the Philippines, nor its people
ever subjugated or enslaved like the Africans. It was not a relationship of equals necessarily, for
racism and cultural imperialism abounded on both sides of the Pacific (with Edward Said’s notion
of Orientalism almost rampant on the Western edge), but the particular and often parallel
connections between the two have remained. Each a respective “city on a hill” for its way of life unique, bold, and largely unchallenged- Japan and the United States are bookends to the Pacific
Ocean: “It would be difficult to find another cross-cultural moment more intense, unpredictable,
ambiguous, confusing, and electric than this one.”21
Scholars have argued that the American/Japanese relationship has revealed racism,
feminization of the Japanese as an other, and cultural and economical subjugation enacted from
Perry’s arrival to the outbreak of World War II, and beyond. But the intercourse has been shaped
by mutual, domestic, cultural exchanges as well as those actions and forces negative in the U.S.Japanese dynamic. I do not suggest that popular culture exists in a void, but the aim of this thesis is
not to tread on already well-wOm ground. If the conversation shifts that way, it is only in the service
of reading the cultural texts I have chosen in their immediate context — one that, as will be seen, is
prone to shifting opinions and perceptions.

21 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 23
12

Less than a century after the Black Ships arrived in Japan came the American Navy, and the
U.S. met Japan again for the first time. When the dust and fallout of World War II had cleared, the
decimated Japanese were pulled back to their feet by General Douglas Mac Arthur and the occupation
agency known as SCAP, the Supreme Command o f Allied Powers.22 Working with Hirohito,
MacArthur and SCAP created a new Japanese constitution, and with considerable economic
assistance from the United States, Japan was able to rebuild its industry, just in time to become a
key supporter and supplier to the U.S. Army in the Korean war. But because the new constitution
forbid Japan from creating or maintaining a standing army,23 once the Korean war ended the focus
became on domestic industry, and “Japan’s top priority became to conquer, peacefully, the business
world by producing high-tech, high-quality products.”24 By the 1980s, Japan was no longer a place
from which one bought cheap goods, but high-end electronics and software, and the Japanese
economy was one of the most powerful in the world: “the yen rose in value and became a currency
of reference, although always in association with the American dollar.”25

In 1964, Time Magazine’s creator and editor-in-chief Henry Luce cheerily exclaimed the
following:

22Dower, Embracing Defeat, 45
23This is stated in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, should the need arise
for Japan to defend itself, it maintains the JSDF, or Japanese Self-Defense Force. Ostensibly the
JSDF is not to be used for purposes other than defending the Japanese mainland, but Japan did
deploy some of these forces to Iraq in 2004. It seems an odd double-standard is in action.
JSDF website: http://www.mod.go.ip/gsdf/ Aug. 5, 2008
24Frederic and Roth, Japan Encyclopedia, 336
25Ibid., 336
13

“In all the annals of history, it would be difficult to match the extremes of adulation
and hate, treachery and trust, cooperation and terrible violence which have marked
the short, intense relationship between Japan and the U.S. ...Today Japan and the
U.S. are intricately linked by trade, defense policies, and political systems - and are
even having somewhat of a cultural love affair.”26
Nearly two decades after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Luce’s bright
words inhabit the period of historical imagination that I have referred to as the era of “denial.”
Beyond the Second World War, before the upheavals of Vietnam and Reaganomics, it is the period
in which Speed Racer emerged, a culturally ambiguous representation of a historical lull, a text that
effortlessly and internationally bridges the turbulent experiences of trauma and recovery. When
history moved far enough beyond the events of World War II to a new generation that did not have
the same ideals or experience the same cultural contexts as their predecessors, Akira paved the way
to a final internal/international reconciliation of history, memory and societies.
Roland Kelts reminds us that “...it is true that in the wake of the two atomic bombs - the
most immediately destructive weapons used in human history thus far (not to mention the
firebombing of its cities which ultimately killed more than the A-bombs did), Japan avidly embraced
the products of American popular culture.”27 However, Susan J. Napier establishes a baseline for
these encounters by asserting that the texts should speak for themselves: “turning to contemporary
Japan, the works...show a fascinating and problematic relationship with history, starting with

26Naoko Shibusawa, Am erica’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007): 29
27Roland Kelts, Japanamerica: How Japanese Pop Culture Has Invaded the U.S. (New
York: Palgrave-MacMillian, 2006), 38
14

Godzilla’s attempt to rewrite it...and ending with Akira’s largely successful effort to erase it.” 28This
dynamic of history and memory brought forth first a film steeped in the most American of genres,
a “B” movie.

Chapter 2 - Godzilla
The importance of his dramatic entrance cannot be understated. It may be preceded with regal
threats of godly dominance in Shakespearian terms — “Therefore in fierce tempest is he coming/ In
thunder, and in earthquake, like a Jove[.]”29 — or in the colloquialisms that designate his most
famous and world-altering actions: “Oh no, there goes Tokyo!”30 A familiar icon on both sides of
the Pacific, Honda Ishiro’s 1954 film Godzilla staged Japan’s historical trauma. From the depths of
a conflict-tainted ocean he rose, an ancient relic woken by a post-modern disaster, the combination
o f the past and future resulting in a creature, a movie, a concept, a metaphor that would hit Japan and
the U.S. in successive but markedly different waves.
While the Japanese had established a cinema culture in the early part of the 20th century, the
fifteen years31 of the Asian conflict had seen the film market dominated by movies whose thematic
purposes and ultimate goals were to fuel the tide of imperial patriotism across the country.

28Susan J. Napier, “Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster From Godzilla to
Akira,” Journal o f Japanese Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer, 1993), 331
29William Shakespear, Henry V, IV, i, 1003-4
30Blue Oyster Cult, “Godzilla” Some Enchanted Evening, Catalogue No. 75204, 1978
31In Japan, because of the beginning of aggressive actions in China during the
Manchurian Incident of 1931, World War II is referred to as being 15 years in length. Akira Iriye,
Pearl Harbor and the Coming o f the Pacific War: A B rief History With Documents and Essays,
(N.p.: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1996) 3.
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Employing a kind of nationalism called “Nihonjinron”32, such patriotic films were of particular
concern to the SCAP officials who set about rebuilding Japan’s popular culture market in the
immediate postwar years. These films were banned and destroyed, and SCAP deployed a list of
themes that were henceforth deemed dangerous and illegal.33
But the wonderful world of film would not be denied, and seeking to revive and rebuild its
international markets, Hollywood authorities leapt at the chance to spread their influence to the
Pacific Rim. As Hiroshi Kitamura describes in his dissertation on American film in postwar Japan:
“SCAP responded to Hollywood with zeal and enthusiasm. Aware of its potential popularity
and appeal, SCAP eagerly incorporated American movies to further the occupations
programs. ...SCAP believed that Hollywood entertainment could aid the hearts and minds
of the war-shattered population. Knowing that its products had gained substantial following
during the interwar years, Mac Arthur’s headquarters believed that American films could
provide light and hope to the despaired. Ultimately, the mixture of entertainment and
enlightenment would facilitate Japan’s reconstruction.”34

32“Nihonjinron” is a word which means “the theories of Japanese cultural or racial
uniqueness.” The ideology of “nihonjinron” is similar to “white man’s privilege” -that this
uniqueness allows them a kind of privilege unavailable to other cultures or races- and has been a
cornerstone of nationalist ideology. This particular definition is from Jim Breen’s WWWJDIC,
accessed online at http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~iwb/cgi-bin/wwwidic.cgi71C Dec. 16, 2008
33According to Hiroshi Kitamura, SCAP’s Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) had a
bureau in charge of Japanese cinema, which stipulated the Motion Picture Code for Japan. The
Code consisted of nine items. To name a few: “...the code stipulated that all film narratives
conformed to the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the Allied Forces. Portrayals of
crime and militarism were prohibited, unless they were both shown as ‘evil.’ All themes and
narratives that were ‘capable of disturbing public tranquility’ were banned...and the presentation
of historical events were permissible only when they were presented ‘truthfully.’”
Hiroshi Kitamura, “Globalizing Entertainment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of
Defeated Japan, 1945-1952”(Phd Thesis, University of Wisconsin: Madison, 2004), 88
34Ibid., 60
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O f course, SCAP and Hollywood had no idea that their planned reconstruction would bring
about the means for a new Japanese film trend of deconstruction, but Japanese audiences viewed
films within the lens of their own histories and experiences of war, defeat, and occupation. Kitamura
asserts, “fans voiced a strong willingness to see Hollywood movies as a cultural text that transcended
mere entertainment. They made sense of the movies in their own terms by discussing different ways
through which to gain a deeper understand of the world behind the silver screen.”35 Films were
explicitly understood to offer deeper meanings and truths about the world. This was not lost on
Japanese filmmakers.
The Japanese would use that knowledge when they once again stepped behind their own
cameras. Although seemingly worlds apart, Godzilla was part o f the same resurgence of Japanese
filmmaking that also saw the creation of Kurosawa Akira’s legendary samurai films. Undeniably
influenced by the American trend of popular and genre movie-making that had been rejected by
European film elites, the Japanese read —or at least witnessed the power of— the “cultural texts”
inherent in the Hollywood imports, even in the radioactive monster movies prevalent in the early
1950s.36 The birth of Godzilla himself is, therefore, a study in transnational media: reworking an
American theme, Japan created a monster unrecognizable although blatantly familiar to viewers in
both Japan and the U.S..

35Ibid., 244
36A few of the radiation-caused/radioactive monster movies from the 1950s include: The
Beast From 20,000 Fathoms (1953), The Magnetic Monster (1953), Bride o f the Atom, aka Bride
o f the Monster (1955), Tarantula (1955), Phantom From 10,000 Leagues (1956), and Beginning
o f the End (1956). Jerome F. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2002), 362-4
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Released in Japan in the same year that the stars of THEM! were making their insectuous way
across the U.S., Godzilla was a triumph of special effects, high-class casting, and two men
alternating inside a giant and mercilessly hot rubber suit, accompanied by an orchestral score written
exclusively for the film by Ifukube Akira. Its tepid reception by American critics starkly contrasted
the overwhelmingly positive feedback and commercial success it generated in Japan; in domestic
sales alone, the movie paid for itself twice over. When it was brought to the U.S. two years later in
1956, however, it arrived as a foreigner dressed in familiar clothes. Pandering to “the filmgoing
masses that demanded to hear their movies rather than read them[,]” Hollywood reworked the film
so it would play as “a mass-market, thrill-a-minute horror flick, not a dark and broody art-house
release.”37 Just another nuclear monster to be vanquished by the very science that created it at the
end of the day, Godzilla’s American face was devoid of anything but pure entertainment value. To
the editing floor fell fragments of the film that kindled reminders of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along
with an ambiguous ending that pondered the necessity and intelligence of continuing to build and
test nuclear weapons. Replacing the somber nuclear fear was a trite final monologue that spoke of
a day saved and happiness (however false) restored.
The Godzilla film that Honda and the Toho Studios made was not made to be evaluated as
camp or comedy. “With even just a glimmer o f understanding about the filmmaker’s intentionsf,]”
Steve Ryfle suggests in the companion book the 2006 DVD release of the official version,
“[...JGorjira [sic] emerges as one of the great antinuclear films[,]”38displaying in unwavering detail

37William Tsutsui, Godzilla On My Mind: Fifty Years o f the King o f Monsters (New
York: Palvgrave MacMillan, 2004), 38
38Steve Ryfle, “Godzilla’s Footprint,” DVD booklet from Gojira: The Original Japanese
Masterpiece, Classic Video, 2006
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the dangers of nuclear testing both on nature and on the human population with which it fatefully
interacts. Islands are devastated, cities, are destroyed, oceans polluted. Homes collapse on their
inhabitants. Children are orphaned. People are injured and burned beyond recognition and lie in
hospital hallways waiting to die. All the suffering in the film issues from one profound, terrible
source.
Godzilla was a both revision and rejection of history; in the first sense, we can see an
example of the Japanese who wrote themselves into a position on the side of right, ensuring a victory
that actual history denied. In the second sense, Godzilla embodies a kind of national punishment,
both for Japan’s actions during the war, and for ultimately losing it. That defeat forced the populace
to endure not only “the unendurable,”39 —their defeat and impending occupation— but the
catastrophic atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whose after-effects would be felt for years
to come. The monster is at once both penance, and a despairing cry—the suffering of the film allows
Japanese to reject any culpability that could justify so great a punishment. Beneath Godzilla’s
contrition lurks resentment and the hint of retribution. It is no accident that while in his rampage
through Tokyo that Godzilla tears down buildings erected in a conspicuously western style. He is
ancient and all powerful; he enacts the national pride that no longer dares to be publicly expressed.
He is a stubborn reminder it cannot be killed or made beautiful.
For Japanese viewers, Godzilla existed as both the terrifying other and the misunderstood
self. The film’s destruction of both Japanese cities and o f the monster itself brought a (necessary?)

39In his official speech to the Japanese populace declaring surrender, Emperor Hirohito
urged his people to “endure the unendurable and suffer what is insufferable” - the unendurable
being the shameful loss of the war and its repercussions and affect on the Japanese national self.
Accessed online: http://web.iiav.cunv.edu/~iobrien/reference/obl01 .html Aug. 6, 2008
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decimation, a trauma that was personal, recognizable, and achingly specific to Japan. It evoked
reminiscent o f familiar scenes of devastation on a physical and human level unimaginable to those
who lived through the atomic bombings or feel the creeping terror of the irradiated tuna carried on
the Daigo Fukuryu Maru.40 A woman crouches beneath an awning, watching the monster’s fiery
rampage and cradling her small children and telling them tearfully that soon they’ll join their father,
apparently a casualty of war. Sweeping images of hospital hallways linger on the bandaged and the
burned, the rows of bodies with helpless families beside them, waiting for the few doctors to do what
little they can while the city falls outside. They could be scenes from any country in any war, but
particularly in a Japanese context, they were reminders of a particular pain felt only too recently.
The larger tragedy o f Godzilla locates the film’s trauma in the sorrowful tasks the humans
in his wake must undertake. Dr. Yamane, the father of the female protagonist, sits in his darkened
study and laments that Godzilla must be destroyed. The people of Odo Island and Tokyo must bury
their dead and rebuild their homes. The film’s final moments offer a shockingly blunt parable of
blame and morality in regards to atomic science: faced with the necessity of using his terrible
“Oxygen Destroyer,” Dr. Serizawa is distraught at the idea that such a terrible creation might ever
be used again. He dies on the ocean floor with Godzilla to ensure that no one can ever recreate the
weapon or learn the secret from him. Dr. Yamane eulogizes him with the uncomfortable sentiment
that, “if we keep testing H-bombs, it is possible that someday, another Godzilla might appear
somewhere in the world.” It is a sharp and poignant stab at the Manhattan Project scientists and the

40The “Daigo Fukuryu Maru Incident,” known in English as the “Lucky Dragon Incident”
will be explained below.
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American government who not only used awfulness when they invented it, but continued to expound
upon it for decades after.

Picture this.
After long months of travel, an immigrant arrives on the California coast. Fumbling in a new
society, the immigrant attempts to establish a life, adapting the clothing, housing, and social systems
o f the new environment. But the clothes are always ill-fitting, the house never quite a home, and the
individual is still regarded as a curiosity. In order for its neighbors to understand the newcomer, they
rename and give him a new background, reworking his life story until they can speak to and about
the immigrant in their own familiar context. Such an immigrant was Godzilla.
When producers Harold Ross and Richard Kay unleashed “Godzilla: The King of Monsters”
onto the American public in 1956, the movie met an audience that had never known continental
destruction except on its periphery. This important distinction is specifically relevant in this case,
says Takayuki Tatsumi, because “while Japan has continuously emphasized the threat of the atomic
bomb, the United States has never forgotten the indignity of Pearl Harbor.”41
To say that the reworking of Godzilla for American audiences was meant to glorify the
destruction of the sneaky yellow bastards who attacked Hawaii would be a bit unfair; by the end of
World War II, the U.S. had repaid Japan for that insult twice over. Yet the producers were unable
in any sense to evoke the scorched earth to an audience who had never experienced an event of that

41Takayuki Tatsumi, Full Metal Apache: Transactions Between Cyberpunk Japan and
Avant-Pop America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 175
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kind. For Godzilla’s viewers in the U.S., Pearl Harbor was the most familiar point of reference,
which meant that the film had a completely different meaning to its new audience.
The resulting (and now-Americanized) film is a garbled reference book of personalization
and second-hand horror. Made to be acceptable in the. eyes of a country still wary of the Asian
“other,” the film’s principle alteration was the insertion —through Hollywood-made scenes intercut
with the original footage— of an all-American male, the journalist Steve Martin (played by
Raymond Burr). The rationale for creating Martin’s character was to offer someone with whom U.S.
viewers could relate; producers did not assume an American audience could or would want to
identify with an all-Japanese cast. As both a journalist — a temporary observer— and an American,
Martin was the focal point through which the audience experienced the disasters of the movie, but
with a tangible sense of detachment. Martin just happened to be there; when he reported to his
superiors on the events shaking Japan, he was the sole and imperfect connection to a world American
publishers hardly imagined. He expresses grief and dismay, but Japan is not his homeland, and so
he will not have to live with its scars. His presence reframes the entire story; the Japanese are
“others” to him and their destruction does not resonate. No one doubts that at the end of the
catastrophe, Martin will return home to his own country. His distance, emotional and ultimately
physical, allows the American film-goer to be complicit in Japan’s punishment.
In the original Japanese version, Godzilla’s extended assault on Tokyo featured a brief but
startling scene wherein a news crew is broadcasting from a TV tower, the anchorman shouting into
the microphone with an almost gleeful frenzy:
“We are reporting to you live from a short-wave transmitter. Godzilla is now approaching
this broadcasting station, heading toward our TV tower! There is no time to take cover! We
don’t know what will happen to us! He is getting even closer! It looks like our doom! I’m
22

watching as he grabs onto the tower! He has incredible strength! This broadcast is over!
Goodbye, everyone, goodbye!”42

In the American version, Martin watches from a building somewhere on the edge of the city,
dramatically relating the carnage to a tape recorder. “Nothing can save the city now,” he intones
solemnly. “This is it, George. Steve Martin signing off from Tokyo, Japan.” Almost devoid of
emotion, Martin’s deadpan send-off is a start contrast to the kamikaze news crew. While their scene
remained in the American version, it was undubbed and un-subtitled, incomprehensible to the
common movie-goer. We see Martin in these scenes only through a window, a small space in a wall
o f misunderstanding, offering only a self-absorbed part of the view. It is this sense of detachment
that permeates the film: the Americans as observers, troubled but unwilling to throw themselves
headlong into an emotional fray that could dredge up old memories. The Japanese personally narrate
their own destruction. Martin observes from afar and gives little sense that he feels threatened
himself.
The contrasts between American and Japanese perspectives are even more apparent in the
film’s climax. At a moment when a quiet, respectful response to destruction might seem more
appropriate, the American version completely excises Dr. Yamane’s warning, showing only a few
seconds of the man as he sits alone and sadly contemplates the ocean. It also breezes past the greater
implications of Dr. Serizawa’s sacrifice, considering only the perceived greater good that has finally
come o f all this terror and condensing it all into a shockingly trite summation: “The menace was

42More than a little reminiscent of the famous recording by the reporter witnessing the
explosion of the Hindenberg in 1937 and the narration of reporter “Carl Phillips” in the Mercury
Theater’s “War of the Worlds” broadcast in 1938.
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gone, and so was a great man. But the whole world could wake up and live again.” There is no lesson
in Godzilla’s destruction, the living have vanquished the threat and found nothing to learn or change.
The Japanese might reject history, but it seemed the Americans are incapable of learning
from it, as the American ending is amoral and unincriminating, absorbing all o f the suffering (or as
much as can be mustered for such a distant other) and none of the guilt, the remorse, or sense of
continued danger. Since 1946, Manhattan Project director J. Robert Oppenheimer had been speaking
out against his creation, only to be subsequently declared a communist and stripped of his security
clearance in 1956. When even the guiding hand behind the atomic bomb was no longer a viable
American hero, let alone citizen, the scariest part of the immigrant fable was how little we looked
into his true self, instead imposing upon him the trappings of ourselves and making him into
something we understood and wanted to see - something novel, but harmless. Godzilla was forced
to assimilate, learning in the process, as Mae Ngai states, “the telos of immigrant settlement,
assimilation, and citizenship has been an enduring narrative of American history, but it has not
always been the reality of the migrant’s desires or their experiences and interactions with American
society and state.”43 And particularly by being o f Asian origin in a country that had permanently
framed Asians as ineligible for complete citizenship, Godzilla would be denied the kind of deep
familiarity or kin found in his home country.

Godzilla was the product of a new kind o f globalization in a specific political moment. By
1949, the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic bomb, a warning and terrifying new threat to the

43Mae Ngai Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making o f Modern America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5
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United States, which could no longer claim the precious monopoly on nuclear power.44 In response,
despite the objections of a number of nuclear scientists and contributors to the Manhattan Project,
on November 1, 1952 the U.S. tested the world’s first Hydrogen bomb on the atoll of Eniwetok in
the Pacific.45 The shot —called ‘Tvy-Mike” and part of Operation Ivy— was a success, but ultimately
the triggering device was inordinately massive; there was no way for it to be used tactically in a
modem combat situation. Operation Ivy opened the door to further H-bomb experimentation, the
most notable of which being the Castle-Bravo test of March 1, 1954. Detonated on Bikini Atoll in
the Marshall Islands, unexpected wind patterns carried the fallout westward, onto the decks of the
Japanese fishing trawler the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (or “Lucky Dragon No. 5"). The crew fell ill with
severe radiation poisoning, and one member died. Unfortunately, by the time of the fatality, the
irradiated catch of the Daigo Fukuryu Mam had already been sold in Japanese fish markets and
panicked a populace already too familiar with the effects of nuclear weapons.46
Godzilla plainly references these events both in conversation and in action. The opening
scene of the Japanese film is of men on a fishing boat, sitting on deck, idling, stmmming a guitar,
etc., when a massive flash erupts from the ocean and sends them scrambling for cover, to no avail.
The ship and its crew are destroyed, and a public too familiar with the events of March 1954 could
not possibly have missed the implications. Within the film Dr. Yamane explicitly states that the Hbomb tests awoke Godzilla from his watery slumber. How convenient that SCAP and the Allied

44The Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb in August, 1949. Brian
VanDeMark, Pandora’s Keepers: Nine Men and the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Back Bay Books,
Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 219
45Ibid, 246-247
46Kevin and Pierce Rafferty, The Atomic Cafe (New Video Group, 2002)
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Forces had left Japan two years before the release of Godzilla. How interesting that the bomb itself
keeps reviving Godzilla, or Godzilla-like destructive forces. The West’s arms race will revive
Godzilla, assuring destruction for the innocent as well.
The monster arrived in the United States a full four years later after the end of the
Occupation. Its mangled state as a new American hero notwithstanding, Godzilla could make little
political sense to an American public obsessed with the Cold War, nuclear fear, and anti
communism. With Japan no longer a threat, Godzilla's presentation of that country’s destruction
emphasized U.S. dominance in the two nations’ relationship. We were allies once more, albeit
bedfellows as strange and opposed as geishas and soldiers. Inasmuch as Japan remained a concern
to the American populace, the pseudo-colonized vision offered by the reedited film was the
predominant characteristic. Did we even remember Japan as anything else? If anyone even saw the
film as a nuclear warning, perhaps it registered no more than as an extreme flight of insane fantasy
—the kind that had produced those giant ants in the desert.47

While Godzilla is now recognized as a traveler with its own message from distant shores, the
American audience and critical responses (or lack thereof) at the time reflected at best ignorance and
at worst a kind of selective blindness. In a time when mutually assured destruction and nuclear
zealotry were two sides of the same coin, Godzilla fell within the parameters of Susan Sontag’s
discussion o f films that “are not just safe, vicarious and cathartic ecstasies of urban obliteration,” but
consider “two fundamental dilemmas characteristic of the atomic age:

47Gordon Douglas, THEM! (Warner Home Video, 2002 [1954])
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“We live under the continual threat of two equally fearful, but seemingly opposed destinies:
unremitting banality and inconceivable terror. It is a fantasy, served out in large rations by
the popular arts, which allows most people to cope with these twin specters. For one job that
fantasy can do is lift us out of the unbearably humdrum and to distract us from terrors —real
or anticipated— by an escape into exotic, dangerous situations which have last-minute happy
endings. But another of the things that fantasy can do is to normalize what is psychologically
unbearable, thereby inuring us to it.”48
What could be more fanciful than a giant lizard tearing apart a modem metropolis that at the
same time represents exactly the force of an all-too real weapon?

Further considering the dichotomy of the destroyed and the destroying, Japan and the U.S.,
Godzilla and nuclear weaponry, Chon Noriega neatly summarizes the essential point of conflict:
“...in film criticism the concept of the repressed-retumed-as-Other allows us to examine the
projection of ourselves onto another’s existence. In doing so, we avoid the other culture.
Finally, because we are unable to acknowledge ourselves as the Other in another culture’s
text, we can only colonize the other’s text.”49
In trying to make the text available to a larger audience, Godzilla's producers, along with American
viewers, misinterpreted, misrepresented, and misunderstood. The Japanese Godzilla has long-since
entered into the cultural lexicon of our age — who doesn’t recognize the spectacle of a monster
flattening Tokyo behind a mob of shrieking Japanese?— but the millions of Americans under 30
have grown up alongside monsters and watched a hundred representations of catastrophic
destruction, yet never known the nuclear fear that accompanied the genre originals. The atrocious
1998 remake of Godzilla, where the monster is unleashed on New York City, seemed trite and
overdone; what doesn ’t destroy New York these days?

48Quoted in Tsutsui, Godzilla, 107-108
49Chon Noriega, “Godzilla and the Japanese Nightmare: When ‘THEM!’ is U.S.” Cinema
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1987): 74
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Until the spring of 2006 when it was released in a double DVD set with its American half
sibling, the original Japanese version of Godzilla was unavailable in the U.S. outside of the rare
arthouse venue. For the first time, however, the convenience of modem technology — an odd
parable, even moreso when we consider just how many of our home electronics come from Japan—
has allowed sixty years of Godzilla-watching Americans not just to reinterpret, but to recognize the
trauma and “recover” the context and language of the immigrant who has lived unassumingly among
us all this time.

Chapter 3 - Speed Racer

In her book, “Millenial Monsters: Japanese Toys and the Global Imagination,” cultural
anthropologist Anne Allison relates an interesting anecdote. Prior to World War II, “the [Japanese]
toy industry had been a vital part of the national economy, valued for its worldwide reputation as a
top-ranked producer of children’s playthings [,]” particularly high-quality metal toys.50When the war
disrupted all aspects of day-to-day society, and all available raw materials were coopted for
militaristic purposes, the toy industry suffered a devastating blow, and the scarcity of necessary
implements continued even into the Occupation.51
However, in a move of extreme ingenuity, in what might have been its darkest hour, the
toymakers of Japan found a solution to their problem - one unintentionally offered by the SCAP
personnel themselves:

50Allison 36
51 Dower, 64
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“...it was here —in the refuse of the occupier’s everyday existence— that the toy industry
found a resource with which to rekindle business... Lacking anything else, Japanese toy
makers used the only substance they could find — discarded tin cans from SCAP food
rations. Modeling these toys after the jeeps being driven by American soldiers...the Japanese
toy industry recycled, both literally and figuratively, the U.S. occupation as fodder for its
postwar reconstruction. [...] American soldiers found these playthings amusing. So did
officials at SCAP, who, already aware of the prewar stature o f the Japanese toy industry,
called its representatives into General Headquarters...and ordered them to manufacture their
ware for American children. ... Japanese toy makers were commanded to send a portion of
their goods to the United States.”52
So it was that — amidst the irony of selling the U.S. its trash back in a newer, shinier form.
Long before Honda and Toyota became household names, an influx of Japanese cars invaded
American homes and makeshift living room streets. A child enamored of a new toy truck would
hardly be prone to questioning its origins, or its arrival; cars were as American as Cracker Jacks.
They were not inherently foreign, but familiar. It was easy to embrace them.
On this tide of metallic wonder came one of the most famous cars of all time, the Mach 5.
At the wheel was the boy would be king of the international racing circuit: Speed Racer.

“Once seen in childhood,” says Trish Ledoux, “Speed Racer is never forgotten, which can
be a bogey or a blessing depending on one’s attitude. Devotees of the daily, half-hour series can’t
get enough of Speed Racer and his adventures both on and off the track. Non-fans find the program
ridiculous in the extreme, its ‘funny’ artwork, jarringly at odds with its ‘straight’ plotlines.”5j

52Anne Allison, Millennial Monsters: Japanese Toys and the Global Imagination,
(Berkeyley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2006): 38
53Trish Ledoux, The Complete Anime Guide: Japanese Animation Film Directory and
Resource Guide (Seattle, WA: Tiger Mountain Pr, 1997), 16
29

Ledoux offers a fair assessment; partaking of large amounts of Speed Racer can be a daunting
experience not so much seen as lived through, its eye-gouging primary colors and breakneck pace
searing into the brain. With his monogrammed helmet, dashing ascot, and large blue eyes, Speed is
the guy next door, provided you live next to someone with a penchant for bouts of excessive
expository dialogue.
The touching story of a boy, his fantastic car, and the weirdly animated friends and family
that support his international racing endeavors, Speed Racer is a strange cultural icon of the 1960s
— a Japanese teenager who has fairly consistently passed as naturalized citizen for going on forty
years. Speed Racer’s frenetic adventures and clipped speech are still recognized and parodied in
contemporary shows like Family Guy and Robot Chicken, even in a commercial for Volkswagen.
Speed is archetypally an American hero: his creators the Yoshida brothers (Tatsuo, Kenji,
and Toyoharu) were inspired by American comic book characters like Superman, one of the reasons
that his nationality was rarely called into question during his wild racing heyday. Closer examination,
however, provides a strange breeding of cultural mores, where the American action star met typically
Japanese conventions of the group-oriented rhetoric and even mortality. Unlike American animation
series’, in Speed Racer cars blow up, rocks fall, missiles fly and even good people die.54 Speed
looked like and posed as an American, but the action and values which framed his adventures were
Japanese.

54In episode 13, “The Race for Revenge (Part 2),” the adventure’s opponent, Flash, is in a
helicopter crash. Although he is almost certainly killed, the fact of his death is never explicitly
mentioned, and his sister Lily is quickly cheered by the promise that she can always find friends
in Speed and Trixie.
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The complicated and interesting truth of Speed Racer is that the Japanese conventions which
with he was portrayed were often lost in the U.S. translation, and thus his stories offered and offer
a muted political meaning in the American context while they specifically critiqued the multi
national order in the third world. Made and presented at a time when the U.S. presence in Southeast
Asia had become a damaging and polarizing force, Speed rebuked the international order of things
even as his adventures affirmed it.55 Designed to showcase a Cold War worldview, Speed’s
adventures critiqued the assumptions and actions of the first world.

According to the official Speed Racer website, Yoshida Toyoharu (commonly known by the
pen name Kuri Ippei) stated that “the series was based strictly on the brothers’ all-out adoration of
America. American movies show a life of abundance in the average household. To the brothers, the
American lifestyle was as fantastic as American comic books.”56 And American comics were
exciting; Kuri easily recalls that he was “overwhelmed and strongly influenced by the character
Superman, his robust physique and his macho appearance. In contrast, Japanese comic books were
amateurish. I longed to design in the realistic style of the Americans.”

55The later 1960's notably being the time in which U.S. forces were not only tearing
through Vietnam, but also finding their way into Cambodia, and Laos. Richard Nixon’s
“Cambodia Incursion Address,” April 30, 1970, accessed online at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixoncambodia.htmL July 26, 2009; Leary,
William, “CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974: Supporting the ‘Secret War,”’ accessed
online at the CIA homepage, http://www.cia.gov/librarv/center-for-the-studv-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art7.htmL July 26, 2009.
56Speed Racer Official Website: http://www.speedracer.com/ Accessed online: Aug. 6,
2008
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“Maha Go, Go, Go” debuted on Japan’s Fuji Television on April 2, 1967, its influences
reflected proudly in its protagonist’s Clark Kent hairstyle and the aforementioned sparkling azure
gaze. But in his home country, this young man had a distinctly Japanese name: Mifune Go. A
construction of the easily pun-able Japanese language, “Mifune” came from the celebrated actor
Mifune Toshiro, and “go” is a homonym for the Japanese word for “5;” suddenly the huge red “M”
on the Mach 5's hood makes sense, as does the seemingly incongruous “G” on our hero’s
shirt.^Accompanied by a hypnotically catchy theme, we meet Go as he leaps into his fantastic car
and sets off down the racetrack and out into the world. The Japanese opening depicts Go driving
alongside a host of African fauna, through jungles and across the Savannah, before sweeping across
the American southwest and the Sahara desert. As long as there’s space to drive, he is at home
anywhere in the world. The Mach 5 —the epitome of progress, speed, and Western modernity—
knows no bounds. Everything about him and his wonderful car push Western ingenuity and newness.
And that’s a very good thing for him, as five months after its initial release, the newly dubbed
(in name and language) “Speed Racer” was syndicated worldwide in 1967. Distributed for handy
home viewing by the Trans-Lux Television Corporation,58with a new moniker apt for both his racing
penchant and his breakneck speech (is he actually on speed?), Speed became a culturally ambiguous
character, a change helped in no small way by his creator’s influences: the international setting of
the show. Moreover, Speed’s is an international and comfortable world. He and his family live a

570ther name changes included the name of Go/Speed’s girlfriend, from the Japanese
Michi to Trixie, hence the noticeable M on her pink shirt. Speed’s mechanic was renamed
Sparky from “Sabu;” luckily his shirt and initials continued to match.
58Elizabeth Moran, Speed Racer: The Official 30thAnniversary Guide, (New York:
Hyperion, 1997), 28
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distinctly un-Japanese, indeed almost suburban lifestyle. They reside in a sprawling house of
unapologetic 1960's international modem design; they own and operate at least one car; they can
afford to board not only a monkey but Sparky and Trixie alongside their remaining two sons.
As we leam in the first episode, Speed is actually the middle son of the Racer family. His
older brother Rex left the family years ago after a racing accident led to a confrontation between he
and family patriach “Pops Racer.” After Rex crashed his car in a rash attempt to win a race, Pops
forbid him from competing further until he grew up and became a more responsible driver.
Unwilling to accept this ultimatum, Rex felt he was “given no choice but to run away from home,”
and supposedly vanished. This devastating loss of his eldest son made Pops unwilling to
accommodate Speed's desire to pursue a similar career, and it is only through Speed's earnestness,
tenacity, and a fair amount of flat-out disobedience that he convinces his father he won't act with
Rex's hubris. Seen in a Japanese context, it would be hard to miss the allegorical implications of the
family dynamic. Rex's rebellion against the father who trained him, and the tragic consequences and
Speed's avowal to make Pops proud and do it right this time, are a microcosmic representation o f
Imperial Japan and its postwar identities respectively.
Further metaphors abound in the very structure of Speed's pursuit of the World Racing
Championship. I have spoken already o f the global scale and setting of the show; nowhere is it more
blatantly and graphically implied than in the opening, where a team o f cars in V-formation (with the
Mach 5 at the apex, of course) drive latitudinal and longitudinal lines across a map of the world.
Speed and his friends are in a different country every week, the location (sometimes real, sometimes
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not) often stated by the authoritative voice of narrator Jack Curtis39 just after the title screen.A
number of Speed's victories also encompass the foiling of some devious international plot. For
example, in “The Trick Race,” a terrorist group known as “International Spies Incorporated” has a
long standing grudge against Speed and the mysterious Racer X for foiling a number of their evil
schemes that have ranged from scientific espionage to political assassination. In several episodes,
it is implied —if not explicitly stated— that the fate o f world peace rests in Speed’s yellow-gloved
hands.
The masked rider who both challenges and assists Speed in his many endeavors, Racer X is
actually (and obviously) the estranged Rex Racer. Over the course of the series it becomes clear that
Racer X works for an international police organization (akin to a fancified Interpol) and keeps tabs
on Speed as both a watchful older brother and a secret agent. Particularly in the teen years of the
Cold War, when concerns regarding global intelligence and alliances ran particularly high, there is
little to question in its thematic inclusion in Speed Racer. In fact it probably passed as mundane or
commonplace, particularly in an America that still had its schoolchildren diving under their desks
in anticipation of a Soviet airstrike. Luckily, Speed Racer is no red, and he can't lose. The show
clearly defines where the appropriate lines of power are —the U.S., western Europe, and Japan as
the flagship (flag island) for the capitalist rhetoric in East Asia. While he traverses Africa and even
the Middle East, he never ventures near Vietnam or Cambodia; when in China, he only visits Hong
Kong. Speed is a diplomat, but in the show’s context he cannot bring world peace, only stability and
market-friendly international understanding.

59Curtis also played other voices such as Pops Racer and Inspector Detector. His is the
voiced reality in the series, underlying the import of his voicing the Racer patriarch.
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Two particularly striking examples that further illustrate the series’s geo-politics are episodes
16 and 17, which focus on an event called “The Fire Race.” The story opens with a scene
unequivocally meant to evoke images of the United Nations. The members of this organization, the
League of Countries, have called forth Chief Zuma of Kapekapec, requesting (read: demanding) that
he open the borders to his country. No country can remain isolated forever, they assert, and Zuma's
♦

unwillingness to allow foreign dignitaries or tourists indicates questionable motives, namely that the
Kapekapeckians might be building weapons, a grave concern to the international community. Zuma
denies any sort of weapons program, stating that his resistance is based on fears that the influx of
international traffic would damage the existing culture of his home. Ultimately unable to reach any
kind of consensus on the issue, the League of Counties suggests an international race to decide
Kapekapec's fate: if an outside entrant can beat Kapekapec's legendary racer Kabala, the country will
have to open its doors. Progress will have a showdown with tradition.60
There is much to be read into this story, but I will highlight a few choice elements here.
Despite its native populace dressing in a style that can really only be described as “crazy witch doctor
chic,” Kapekapec has a veiy modem airport, and apparently enough technology for Kabala to have
a car whose features rival the Mach 5. Zuma, his granddaughter Silvana, and the other
Kapekapeckians are generally portrayed as fierce and backward while nevertheless successfully
guarding historic artifacts and maintaining an apparently enviable GDP. The fateful race is through
a labyrinthine volcanic passage that opens once every one hundred years, and only for five hours at
a time. Any racer to fails to make it out will certainly die.

60That this scenario is highly reminiscent of Admiral Perry’s request to the Japanese
government just a century before is unlikely to be purely coincidental.
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Although a dozen racers start the event, the true contest is held among Speed, the villanous,
treasure-hungry Kadar, and Kabala. But underscoring the treacherous nature of reality in “closed”
societies, we learn that Kabala is not even the man himself; he died several years prior, and in his
place is Racer X, who pleads with Speed to lose the race and protect the indigenous culture. In a
show of his cavalier attitude and devotion to progress, Speed brushes off Racer X. This is a race and
not politics, and Speed just wants to win. If culture and history are compromised or denied or
deleted, that is just a consequence of progress, and it's probably better that way.
In blatant disregard of the physical fact that he ostensibly must keep a consistent pace of 165
mph in order to make it out of the tunnel in time (a split-second calculation by Trixie), Speed spends
half the race outside the car, arguing with Racer X or attempting to thwart Kadar’s plans to loot the
cavern of its treasures. But all fears are allayed, of course, as Speed (followed closely by Racer X)
exits the track just as the mountain’s doors close. Our hero wins, finally forcing a compromise
between Zuma and the League of Countries that Kapekapec will be open to tourists for the
ambiguously stated “part o f the year.” Zuma agrees, and the day is saved —as far as we know. Speed
will never go back to Kapeckapec, nor will it ever be mentioned again, although in Silvana, he leaves
behind at least one native attracted to Western technology and manhood, i.e. Speed.
Circa summer 1967, “The Fire Race” episodes in particular are especially loaded as
metaphorical representations of mid-Cold War policies. Physically occupying the space between the
U.S. and the twin monoliths o f Red China, and the U.S.S.R., Japan could just as easily have ended
up on the other side of history. Indeed it once was: like Kapekapec, it took foreign intervention and
initiative to pry open the gates o f Japan and thrust it into the world, first in 1854 and once more in
1945. But look, the show’s narrative seems to suggest, how far Japan has come under its Western
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tutelage; it is a latter-day symbol of the power of capitalist culture and society. Forward momentum
must be maintained. The Kapekapeckians must be liberated from their dangerous isolationist
ideology and made part of the greater global construct, or fall into red shadow and infamy. If this can
only be attained through a car race, why not? It's better than a bomb, as positive international
relations can work towards maintaining and preserving indigenous cultures.
Another episode from later in the series that speaks to dynamics of transnational politics is
40, “The Man Behind the Mask.” No location is designated for the opening sequence, but it takes
place in an airport from which Speed and Trixie are departing for the North American Grand Prix.
Loaded onto the plane with the Mach 5 is a rather imposing looking rocket which belongs to the
scientist Dr. Fantasty.
Ever the gentleman, Speed introduces himself and Trixie to Dr. Fantasty, and as they board
the plane, a man identified only as “Dr. Fantasty’s friend” addresses the crowd, stating excitedly that
the rocket will make space travel accessible to any and everyone. Once seated, Dr. Fantasty reveals
that he invented the fuel that powers the rocket, not the rocket itself, and that it is so potent, “only
a few drops equal one-hundred gallons of high-octane gas.” Speed is impressed, and Trixie exhorts
her desire to go into space, to which the good scientist offers an oddly somber reply: “Someday
you’ll be able to, provided that the fuel is used for peaceful purposes and not war. I’m afraid certain
people want to use my fuel to power weapons, but I’ve been insisting they must not use my fuel for
war purposes.”
Fate and the plotline obviously have other things in store, as the pilot has been killed and the
plane hijacked by men in rather inexplicable tiki-style masks who tell Dr. Fantasty that his fuel will
indeed be used for nefarious and dangerous schemes. The plane is rerouted to a secret island and
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once there, Speed, Trixie, Dr. Fantasty, little brother Spritle and pet monkey Chim Chim (who had
unsurprisingly stowed away in the hold) find themselves the captives of a man who calls himself
“Mark Meglaton the Great.” Meglaton is “an ardent admirer of three things: champion racers, top
scientists, and magnificent works of art.”
Meglaton61 has already stolen quite of bit of the world’s famous art pieces — including the
Mona Lisa— and keeps them in a room that is both earthquake and fire-proof. But he also keeps
another kind of art -a storeroom of gigantic warheads. They are homing missiles to be powered by
Dr. Fantasty’s fuel, making them particularly fast and efficient. Meglaton intends to use Speed, who
“goes to races all around the world” as an intermediary, acquiring more art and loading it into a
rocket that will fly back to the secret island. To ensure he does as commanded, Speed will be chained
to the Mach 5 which is rigged with a bomb, and will be monitored by closed-circuit camera.
Dr. Fantasty’s friend goes to the show’s default police investigator, Inspector Detector, and
insists, “This is a worldwide problem, do you understand? The peace of the world is at stake!” But
the plan is already in progress, and Speed is sent to the Louvre in Paris, then the British Museum and
National Gallery in England. Meglaton states that his ability to subjugate the art world with his
threats have proven he is unstoppable, and he demands that Dr. Fantasty make more fuel so that he
can launch “super missiles one by one at every city in every country around the world...[He] will
make the world surrender.”
Ultimately, Speed manages to convince Meglaton to let him work as Dr. Fantasty’s assistant,
ostensibly to develop the fuel faster, but inevitably turn the proverbial tables on Meglaton, using his
own homing missiles to destroy his lair. In his dying exposition, Meglaton reveals himself to be Dr.

61A pun on “megaton” (the yield of a bomb) and “megalomaniac,” perhaps?
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Fantasty’s friend: “You’re disappointed in me Doctor, but I’m an ambitious man and I saw your
invention as a means to get what I wanted. I knew that if I possessed your rocket fuel I could possess
the world.” Meglaton eventually suffocates in his own private museum, Speed and Trixie continue
on to the North American Grand Prix, and Dr. Fantasty states, relieved that “Thanks to Speed, my
rocket fuel will now be used only for peaceful purposes.” It’s never clear if any of the art is returned.
It is decidedly telling that the great museums Meglaton targets are in Europe, reaffirming
Speed’s association with the western (not the communist or non-aligned) world. In a short scene
where Racer X tells Mom and Pops Racer about Meglaton’s plan, he suggests that Speed may soon
“be coming to this country,” maintaining the ambiguous location of the family home and of Speed’s
true nationality— really, it could be anywhere, assuming anywhere is decidedly Western-centric and
progressive.
This episode aired in 1968, the same year that the United Nations opened the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty for signing to the five countries then considered nuclear powers.62Undoubtedly
“The Man Behind the Mask” plays to the continued fear of treaty subversion, of madmen compassing
exciting new science for their own sinister ends, but the episode also resolves itself and the issue
easily, and emphasizes the necessity of using science for peaceful and exploratory purposes. With
his upstanding nature and no discemable allegiance, Speed’s opposition to weapons proliferation
marks him as a conscientious citizen of the world with whom anyone could identify.

We encounter Anne Allison again in her contribution to Joseph Tobin’s essay collection,
“Pikachu’s Global Adventure: The Rise and Fall of Pokemon.”

62The Nuclear Information Project: “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
[NPT]” Accessed online: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt Apr. 22, 2009
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“What makes Japan newly successful in its marketing of games, comics, and cartoons is not
simply technology or business prowess but what some call the ‘expressive power’
(hyougenryoku) of Japanese creators. According to some, the stories, images, and ideas
generated by these products constitute an emerging ‘international common culture’ in which
Japan’s contribution is both significant and historically unprecedented.”63

In the same volume, Iwabuchi Koichi carries her ideas one step further when he discusses
“[...]cultural artifacts in which bodily, racial, and ethnic characteristic [sic] have been erased or
softened:
“This is particularly evident in Japanese animation where the characters, for the most part,
do not look ‘Japanese.’ Such non Japanese-ness is referred to in Japanese as “mukokuseki,”
which literally means something or someone lacking any nationality, but which is also used
to refer to the erasure of racial or ethnic characteristics and context from a cultural
product.”64 (58)

It would seem that Speed Racer exemplifies both Allison and Iwabuchi’s points: here is a
violently expressive Japanese show whose American influence strips it of its national origins while
simultaneously allowing it a familiar iconic status around the world. Ethnically ambiguous once
outside of Japan, Speed belongs nowhere and everywhere; he is as recognizable to the audience he
found in the U.S. in the 1960's as he is to the Japanese. But he occupies a particular space between
Japan and the U.S. because he is not inherently “American;” there is nothing of the U.S. about him.
Examination of the series reveals Japanese themes that couldn’t be erased by a change in
language: the group dynamic and circle of family and friends that constantly surround and assist
Speed despite his heroic individualist status; the shame and shadow o f a dangerous past embodied

63Allison, Millennial Monsters, 36
64Koichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese
Transnationalism, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 58
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in Racer X ’s hubris and eased by Speed’s international cosmopolitanism; the ongoing lessons of
mortality.65 Even in his moment of greatest triumph, winning the “Race Around the World,” Speed
is not alone - Sparky is riding with him, Spritle and Chim Chim follow close behind and gather
important information, and the rest of his family and friends watch and cheer them on with profound
enthusiasm. The group dynamic remains strong throughout. But again reminding ourselves that the
show itself is a love letter to American culture, we find in Speed Racer the perfectly globalized
citizen. The location of the Racer estate is never specified; Speed has no home because he is at home
everywhere in the (free) world. He is transnational, but as he is also the title-character, the signature
hero who would be familiar to an American audience who wouldn’t even consider seeing him as
anything but one of the guys.
Although it is his large expressive eyes that allow a child familiar with anime to recognize
him as a Japanese invention, it is the American-ness of his mannerisms, story, and truly enviable
sports car that pinpointed him as a native son for a generation of U.S. fans. He is easily identified
with anywhere in the world; while his bravado sometimes eclipses his charm, he is as good a
spokesperson as any to iterate (and reiterate later) the lessons and how-to’s of a world for once oddly
at peace with its detente — it is not a perfect world by any means, and there is still political
corruption and the threat of war, but for the time during which Speed completes his bid for
international fame, we experienced a world racing not towards its own destruction, but to a finish
line where we might finally begin to cease denying unaddressed postwar trauma, and move towards
a victorious recovery.

65Antonia Levi, Samuria From Outer Space: Understanding Japanese Animation (Peru,
Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 1996), 24
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If only all international disagreements could be solved by a good lap around the track; you
bet your life Speed Racer would see it through.

Chapter 4 - Akira

Where were you at the “End o f History?”
Despite its hyperbolic and contentious title, Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay was based
around a discussion of the dominant political structures of a post-Cold War world, and not, as it
would seem, a statement that events would cease and time would be no more. It did, however, echo
a worldly sentiment that the end of the Cold War had changed the course of the future as surely as
its beginning had altered thirty years of global relations.
Where was the end of history? The terrain was unfamiliar, and littered with the nuclear age
debris that no longer conveyed a world order built on armed detente, but a trash heap of global
posturing and antagonistic rhetoric that would have to be cleared in order to build the foundations
o f a brave new international society. Perhaps it truly was the end of history as we knew it. And
maybe it would be easier to move forward if we simply started over altogether, the past consumed
in a silent fade to white. It is this image of blankness that begins Akira, a film that plunges headlong
and headstrong into memory, trauma, and denial, redeeming history even as it seems to “[celebrate]
history’s imminent demise.”66

66Napier, “Panic Sites,” 336
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This animated rendering of Tokyo, July 16,1988 seems to be a fairly unremarkable day. The
sky is clear, traffic lopes along, the city is vast but seems untarnished from an aerial view. The only
sign of impending trouble is a flicker of unspecified motion at the top of the screen, a split-second
not-quite-seen movement that suddenly swells outward into a giant, all-consuming cloud of white
light that evokes nothing but pure atomic imagery. Tokyo is devoured, and the confusion (was it an
attack? Where did it come from?) sets off the long-feared World War III. As the world devolves into
nightmare, no one imagines that ground zero was the psychic consciousness of a little boy whose
very name is often written with the character meaning “bright” - Akira.
A masterpiece of animation, cinematography, and apocalyptic storytelling, Otomo
Katsuhiro’s Akira was a landmark achievement not only for its creator, but for the film and anime
genres as a whole. “It was dark,” Trish Ledoux muses, “it was unsettling; it was unlike any science
fiction story —animated or otherwise— anyone had seen before. It wasn’t the first Japaneseanimated film to be released theatrically in the U.S., but for many, Akira was the film which would
make the crucial break into American pop-culture mainstream.”67Akira garnered a record-breaking
audience in Japan (as Godzilla once had so long ago), became an international phenomenon, a
rallying point for fans of Japan’s (seemingly) singular animation style, and the first icon to be
celebrated for and recognized by its inherent Japanese-ness.
Akira is not the main character o f his own story; he himself is given no lines and few actions,
and appears only in memory and revelation in the film’s climax. It is his power —the “absolute
energy” that blew up Tokyo in 1988— rather than his personage that underscores the story, which
is itself an allegory for a world fallen into excess, unwilling to face its mistakes or invest in its future.

67Ledoux, Complete Anime Guide, 46-47
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A kira’s accidental hero and antihero, Kaneda Shoutaro and Shima Tetsuo respectively, are members
o f a motorcycle gang and failures of the education system; they lack any deep sense of discipline or
allegiance to anything but the present moment —they are ultimate rejects of the postwar Japanese
new power. Tetsuo’s encounter with Takashi, also a psychic and a friend of the long-dead Akira,
awakens Tetsuo’s own innate powers, and he is quickly claimed by the military as part of the
ongoing “Akira Project.” Still seeking to leash the power that ran rampant three decades before, the
scientists ultimately release a monster that neither they nor Tetsuo himself can control. It falls upon
Kaneda, swept into the fray by the loss of his friend and his interest in the resistance fighter Kei, to
set things right, inasmuch as he can.

When Susan Napier suggests that “Akira is perhaps the most vividly realized evocation of
disaster to be produced in Japan thus far,”68 she seems to overlook the madness, terror, and cataclysm
that Godzilla brought to Tokyo forty years earlier. But no one can really blame her for forgetting
—the trauma had long since been buried and subsequently denied by a world that had no desire to
reconsider the implications of its atomic actions. The character of the Colonel says as much as he
considers the monstrous refrigeration facility that houses the remains of Akira: “Look at what they
abandoned in their panic. They were afraid! There were too scared, so they hid it away from the
public. They forgot all shame and honor and cast off the civilization and science we had created, and
shut the lid o f the Pandora’s Box they themselves had opened.”
In the brilliance o f Akira, however, there will be no more hiding. The fact that the date of
Akira’s psychic collapse is firmly established as July 16, 1988 is no accident —forty-three years

68Napier, “Panic Sites,” 336
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earlier to the day, the scientists of the Manhattan Project had detonated the world’s first atomic bomb
in Alamogordo, New Mexico. How much more fitting a remembrance could there be than a nearly
identical explosion? And why shouldn’t Japan, with its aforementioned affection for razing Tokyo
to the ground, explode itself this time, completing the circle of destruction? Why shouldn’t this
period of history end the way it began?
Echoing the refrain that all we ever learn is that we never learn, the scientists of Akira have
continued to pursue their energy project, apparently operating under the assumption that they can
somehow avoid the mistakes of the past. After all, Akira’s body was dissected and bequeathed to
their generation for study. Surely after all this time, they would finally know what to do, and how
to do it right. Watching Tetsuo’s psychic energy patterns spike to dangerous level, the Colonel
briefly muses whether or not this power — “the power o f god,” as the chief scientist refers to it— can
or should be grasped by human hands. His contemplation is short-lived, however: “But we have to.
We have to touch it and control it.” His brusque manner and military stylings leave no question that
he is not only a mirror but an indictment of the Manhattan scientists who bespoke similar
conclusions, an uncanny echo of the navy/military, and a rejection of the responsible adults in
Godzilla.
Science and the half-forgotten lessons o f past mistakes haunt Neo-Tokyo. Politicians and
researchers have struggled to keep the ghosts under wraps, but Tetsuo’s Godzilla-esque rampage
summons them back to the surface. Although it is his unrestrained psyche that destroys the city, he
is not entirely to blame; Tetsuo and Kaneda are trapped in the confines o f a world order created long
before they were bom, and it has been their misfortune to inherit a world devastated by trauma and
denial.
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In an effort to stop Tetsuo’s ultimate metamorphosis into a catastrophic amalgamation of
flesh and psychosis, Takashi and two other members of the Akira Project —Kiyoko and Masaru,
childhood and still childlike friends of Akira— summon Akira to take Tetsuo away, but Kaneda is
accidentally caught in the mushrooming light of revelation. Against the urgings of his friends,
Takashi sprints toward the encroaching disaster to save Kaneda because, he says, “it’s not his fault.”
The return of Akira is a symbol o f the sins of the past revisited on the present, but through the efforts
of a few individuals who dare to face trauma head-on, this time the future escapes the wrath of
history. Kaneda lives, and one hopes that the horror he has seen and experienced has finally made
an impact that cannot be paved over or ignored. He rides back into the ruined city, but while he
moves away from the site of traumatic past, we can hope that this time he’ll take its lessons with
him.
Unlike Godzilla, these corollaries between nuclear war and the dangers of losing control were
not excised from the film when it reached the U.S. No longer the hesitant population unwilling to
even speak the names Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Americans embraced Akira for everything it was,
stylistically and thematically. Beautiful and horrible, confusing and succinct, Akira arrived in time
to show us a fate we had narrowly avoided, and to encourage a new analysis of the pain of history
that the Cold War had so efficiently denied. Akira is usually construed as an apocalyptic wet-dream,
a nihilistic symphony of catastrophe that glorifies the end of all things, but I have chosen to interpret
it in a different light, a nearly post-history text that suggested car races and ambiguous alliances were
all well and good, but now it was time to heal.
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Akira is rightfully considered a cult classic, the leader of the anime revolution. The children
who watch -and recognize- anime on the Cartoon Network today may not be aware, but they might
never have met Pikachu if Akira hadn’t come through the door with SWAT team ferocity and
efficiency. While its roots are in the flash that summoned Godzilla, and its style bom of the same
American-influenced animation envy that produced Speed Racer, the film has never been anything
other than explicitly Japanese. It was not an immigrant, nor was it confused with the natives. It was
and is appreciated not for a version that was stripped of its identity or submitted to a removal of its
messages. There are no extraneous cast additions, and the characters keep their original (and
distinctly Japanese) names. Akira is the ambassador, a transnational traveler that actually transfers:
it carries clearly and permanently one culture’s vision to another with its differing social and cultural
paroxisms intact.
The blinding light of history is no longer a wall, but merely an obstacle on the road to
recovery. With a good pair of sunglasses and a tricked-out motorcycle, who could resist going for
a ride?

Chapter 5 - Conclusions

Ten years ago, anime and Japanese cultural products were a niche market. Akira and its ilk
were relegated to the children’s section of video stores, Godzilla to science fiction where it would
continue to be viewed as an effort in pure camp. Speed Racer, though celebrating its 30th anniversary
in 1997, had not been seen on the air in years, and existed in no official form for consumption —you
might have found it on tapes at the back of a closet. Japan itself was reeling from the collapse of its
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bubble economy. It seemed that the distance between Japan and the U.S. had not been traversed at
all.
We find ourselves now two decades removed from the so-called end of history, recognizing
that not only has history continued ever dynamically, but that true international and political power
encompasses not one governmental structure, but an understanding of all of them. In order to stay
afloat in the sea of modem affairs, one has to learn how to manage the flows of globalization, and
in the United States, to accept and understand the specific and particular nature of globalization in
response to its relationship with Japan. Katsuno and Maret suggest that, “There is no longer a solid
line separating the Japanese and American cultural spheres. The global flow of pop culture and
media contributes to an expanding complex of shared texts and references.”69Children bom after the
fall of the Berlin Wall are now applying for college, and they have grown up in a world where, Kelts
offers, “we no longer refer to Japan as ‘the far East,’ not only because we fly west to get there, but
also because Japan, literally and figuratively, feels a lot closer to us than it used to.”70
Although I maintain that Godzilla, Speed Racer, and Akira are connected within and as
transnational history, standard-bearers of a relationship of particular global uniqueness, it would still
be possible to dismiss them as mere cultural imports that have done little to affect the American
conception of the past and the world. What should it matter that they speak to trauma, denial, and
recovery if we were not the intended audience, and we did not recognize those themes? That was
then and there, and this is here and now.

69Joseph Tobin, ed. “Localizing the Pokemon TV Series for the American Market,”
Pikachu’s Global Adventure: The Rise and Fall o f Pokemon (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 2004): 89
70Kelts, Japanamerica, 37
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We embrace this conclusion only at our own peril, for it denies the significance of the
Japanese-American connection and speaks to a self-understanding that has taken nothing from the
past half-century. The local and the familiar and now bound up in the larger narrative of the world,
as Morley and Robins state that, “Whilst globalization may be the prevailing force of our times, this
does not mean that localism is without significance...Globalization is, in fact, also associated with
new dynamics of re-localization. It is about the achievement of a new global-local nexus, about new
and intricate relations between global space and local space.”71 Godzilla, Speed Racer, and Akira
are commodities who represent exchange, the transfer of ideas and emotions. The feelings inherent
in them are the site of a cultural international relationship. And within that global construct, the
transnational travels of the immigrant, the native son, and the ambassador are key players in the
American national identity whether or not they were intended as such.
Charles Cohen asserts, “that those who forget the past tend to repeat it, those who have never
learned about it do not even know enough to forget it, and those who, through either obliviousness
or ignorance do not come to grips with it, will be at history’s mercy on the day when it takes them
by surprise and smirkingly lays them low.”72 Globally, we share a history riddled with scars earned
by not heeding this warning. Memory is an elephant, is traumatic and painful and more easily denied
than accepted, but in order to recover from the wounds of the past and to move forward to a more
enlightened age of international understanding, we must look closer at what we passed over as
inconsequential the first time.

71Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization, 43
72Homepage of Charles L. Cohen. Accessed online: http://historv.wisc.edi3/cohen Apr. 22,
2009
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The guiding path of my research is laid out in the words of T.S. Eliot, in the “Love Letter of
J. Alfred Prufrock:”
“We shall not cease from exploration,
and the end of all our exploring,
will be to arrive where we started,
and know the place for the first time.”
Departing from the end of history, we find ourselves at the beginning, hopefully better
informed, better equipped to deal with trauma, denial, and recovery, better able to learn from it. The
process is not static and is the responsibility of international society as a whole; it is the transnational
facets of world culture that will enable us to redefine ourselves and our place, and connect with one
another in the larger context of shared experience. It is facilitated by the texts that continually open
themselves to political, social, and cultural analysis. This is where we came in, and from where we
will leave again. History is not over. It has already started, and it is in the pursuit of a more
enlightened future that we take our place behind the wheel, drive out into the world, and go, go, go.
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